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IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS 
AND ALIEN CITIZENS 
Leti Volpp* 
IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA. By Mae Ngai. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 2004. Pp. 377. $35. 
INTRODUCTION 
America is a nation of immigrants, according to our national 
narrative. This is the America with its gates open to the world, as well 
as the America of the melting pot.1 
Underpinning this national narrative is a very particular story of 
immigration that foregrounds the inclusion of immigrants, rather than 
their exclusion. Highlighted in this story is the period before 1924, of 
relatively unfettered European immigration, and the period after 
1965, post the lifting of national origins quotas. Also underlying this 
national narrative is a particular story about what happens once 
immigrants enter. In this story the immigrant traverses smoothly from 
settlement to assimilation and then citizenship. This social experience 
is accompanied by a teleology of legal categorization, whereby the 
immigrant is first lawfully admitted as a permanent resident, and then 
naturalizes to become a citizen.2 
In a stunning and beautifully written book, historian Mae Ngai3 
directs our attention to a history occluded in our national narrative of 
* Professor of Law, American University Law School. Visiting Professor of Law, UCLA 
School of Law. - Ed. Many thanks to Muneer Ahmad and David Eng for their extremely 
helpful comments. 
1. For an example of a description of America as a "nation of immigrants," that also 
describes "gates [open] to the world" and the "melting pot," see AM. PARK NETWORK, 
STATUE OF LIBERTY NATIONAL MONUMENT HISTORY (2001), at http://www.americanpark 
network.com/parkinfo/sl/history/nation.html. 
2. For the argument that this national narrative is waning, see Hiroshi Motomura, 
Americans-in-Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States 
(2005) (draft manuscript, on file with the author). Motomura asserts that the lifting of 
national origins quotas in 1965, which broadened who could be admitted as a legal 
permanent resident, has resulted in permanent residence coming to mean less. The 
permanent resident is no longer considered an "American-in-waiting." Motomura's 
argument is that we should restore permanent residence to this historical status. Id. 
3. Associate Professor of History, University of Chicago. 
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immigration and citizenship. Impossible Subjects examines the 
woefully understudied period between 1924 and 1965, the tenure of 
the national origins quota system. This era began with the passage of 
the Johnson-Reed Immigration Act in 1924 and ended with the lifting 
of national origins quotas with the passage of the Hart-Celler Act of 
1965. This epoch, the most comprehensive immigration restriction in 
U.S. history, literally "remapped the nation" (p. 3). The period of 1924 
through 1965 remapped the nation by developing both a particular 
racial and ethnic identity and a "new sense of territoriality" (p. 3). 
Broad-based immigration exclusion created a heightened sense of 
national borders as well as the state surveillance of those borders, 
which helped produce what we now know as the "illegal alien." 
Ngai's book does not only focus on an understudied historical 
period of immigration regulation; it also centers immigrants who are 
marginalized in immigration scholarship. The subject of her book is 
not the legal permanent resident enjoying an untroubled route to 
American citizenship. Instead, Impossible Subjects primarily 
concentrates on immigrants variously categorized as illegal aliens, 
alien citizens, colonial subjects, and contract laborers.4 
These are immigrants whose experiences we do not center in our 
national narrative. As a result, the juridical regulation that governed 
them has been so hidden in both national and community memory 
that we suffer a collective amnesia. Ngai turns our attention to laws 
and policies, such as those governing the Chinese Confession Program 
of the 1950s, Japanese American citizenship renunciation in the 1940s, 
and Filipino voluntary repatriation in the 1930s, that have largely or 
completely escaped the purview of legal scholarship.5 Impossible 
Subjects features meticulous research that fills important gaps in our 
knowledge of the history of immigration law. But the book does not 
merely show us a new archive; Ngai turns her research to important 
analytical use. 
Throughout the book, Ngai reminds us that what we experience 
today as common sense in terms of our immigration law and policy is 
historically contingent. She describes policies which in the 
4. A note on terminology: For stylistic reasons, I use the term "immigrant" in this 
Review to refer not only to the technically correct sense of the legal permanent resident, but 
also to refer to categories of noncitizens that under the Immigration and Nationality Act 
would be referred to instead as nonimmigrants, aliens, or nationals. I also, following Ngai, 
use the term "illegal alien." As in her book, I use the term not for the purpose of 
reproducing racist stereotypes, but to locate the historical origins and consequences of the 
terni. 
5. Discussion of the Chinese Confession Program is entirely absent in the Jaw reviews. 
For the only substantive discussion of Japanese American citizenship renunciation in the Jaw 
reviews, see Neil Gotanda, Race, Citizenship, and the Search for Political Community Among 
"We the People," 76 OR. L. REV. 233, 242-47 (1997). The repatriation of Filipinos is 
mentioned only in passing. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, American Mestizo: Filipinos and 
Antimiscegenation Laws in California, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 795, 823 & n.112 (2000). 
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contemporary moment seem unthinkable, either in their progressivity 
(for example, statutes of limitation on the federal power to deport, 
which prohibited deportation after the immigrant had resided for one 
year in the United States) or in their regressivity (for example, the 
policy of "pre-examination," which restricted this form of legalization 
to European immigrants ).6 The two examples of these policies, both of 
which magically turned illegal immigrants into lawful ones, also 
demonstrate a central theme of the book. What we believe to be 
hardened borders of citizenship and immigrant status have in actuality 
been enormously malleable. Both citizens and aliens have been 
"made" and "unmade," through both acts of the state and of the 
individual. And the border between the "legal" and the "illegal" has 
been porous. At the heart of the book are the questions of illegality in 
immigration and how illegal immigration came to be cast as the central 
problem of U.S. immigration policy in the twentieth century. 
Today the conflation of the racial identity "Mexican" with the term 
"illegal alien" is indisputable. The two terms completely subsume one 
another in a way that aligns with our everyday understanding of 
immigration control - even while this does not track empirical fact.7 
Impossible Subjects shows us how this conflation was historically 
created. Ngai demonstrates precisely how the "illegal alien" was 
produced as a new legal and political subject and how it became 
synonymous with the racial identity "Mexican." 
Presumptive illegality has not only shaped the experiences of those 
branded as "illegal aliens." Ngai traces how the presence of large 
illegal populations in certain communities has contributed to the 
construction of Asian and Latino communities in general as 
illegitimate, criminal, and unassimilable. These communities are 
peopled by what Ngai calls "alien citizens" (p. 2), persons who enjoy 
the formal status of citizenship as an immigration matter, but lack 
citizenship as a matter of identity. An important section of Impossible 
Subjects is devoted to the notion of alien citizenship. 
6. See discussion, infra pp. 108-09. 
7. The Department of Homeland Security's statistics report that one-third of all 
undocumented persons in the United States are not in unlawful status because they crossed 
the border without lawful admission, but because they were originally lawfully admitted 
(from all over the world), but then overstayed their visa. See Homeland Security: Overstay 
Tracking Is a Key Component of a Layered Defense: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on 
Immigration, Border Sec. , and Claims of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 
(2003) [hereinafter Homeland Security Overstay] (statement of Nancy R. Kingsbury, 
Managing Director, Applied Research and Methods), at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04170t.pdf. In this testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Immigration, Border Security and Claims, Committee on the Judiciary, House of 
Representatives, Nancy Kingsbury of the General Accounting Office asserts that the one­
third figure probably underestimates the extent of overstaying. Id. at 6. 
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Impossible Subjects is incredibly rich in its archival detail, powerful 
in its argument, and broad in its scope. I will first focus on Ngai's 
analysis of the historical construction of the illegal alien through what 
may seem, at first blush, paradoxical: the regulation of legal 
immigration, first, in the form of national origins quotas from the 
Eastern Hemisphere, second, in the form of the bracero program 
made up of workers from Mexico, and, third, through the retention of 
numerical per-country quotas in 1965. I will discuss this history in light 
of President George W. Bush's proposal to create a new guest-worker 
program, as well as Samuel Huntington's controversial new book, 
Who Are We,8 which calls for curbing immigration from Mexico in 
light of its threat to "American national identity." 
I will then turn to Ngai's discussion of "alien citizens." Ngai 
analyzes a relationship between migrancy, nationalism, and war that is 
made visible in the renunciation by 5 ,500 Japanese Americans in 
internment camps of their U.S. citizenship during World War II, as 
well as the legalization of 30,000 Chinese Americans who "confessed" 
their illegal immigration status during the Cold War period. I will 
consider these questions in light of the present "war on terror." 
I .  ILLEGAL ALIENS 
Ngai begins Impossible Subjects by explaining how the Johnson­
Reed Immigration Act of 1924 was simultaneously the end of one era 
and the beginning of another. The Act ended unlimited immigration 
from Europe and for the first time imposed numerical limits on 
immigration through a quota system that ranked the world's 
population in terms of nationality and race. 
Many scholars have made reference to the fact that the Act aimed 
to curtail immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe, which 
soared after World War I.9 The Act accomplished this through basing 
the quotas, first, on figures from 1890, and later, on the census of 1920. 
Ngai explains, in compelling and disturbing detail, why there was such 
a shift. The temporary quota of two percent of the foreign born 
population in 1890, as explicitly discriminatory, was recognized by the 
nativists who led the drive for restriction to be potentially 
controversial.10 Shifting to a quota based on the 1920 census allowed 
8. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S 
NATIONAL IDENTITY (2004). 
9. See, e.g., Patrick Weil, Races at the Gate: A Century of Racial Distinctions in American 
Immigration Policy (1865-1965), 15  GEO. lMMIGR. L.J. 625, 636-37 (2001). 
10. On the debate as to whether to use the benchmark of the 1890 Census, see also 
DESMOND KING, MARKING AMERICANS: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 203-04 (2000); MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, WHITENESS OF A 
DIFFERENT COLOR: EUROPEAN IMMIGRANTS AND THE ALCHEMY OF RACE 83-84 (1998). 
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similar numerical results, inflating the number of Northern European 
slots, now with the appearance of nondiscrimination (p. 22). 
Apportioning slots on the basis of the 1920 census could reach the 
same results, even after mass immigration from Southern and Eastern 
Europe, through switching the statistical pool. The 1920 figures 
apportioned slots not solely based upon the foreign-born population, 
but upon the entire population of the United States, immigrant and 
otherwise, thus maintaining the statistical advantage of Northern 
Europeans. Doing otherwise would, in the words of the immigration 
restrictionist whose concept grounded the 1924 Act, discriminate 
against "those who have arrived at an earlier date and thereby 
contributed more to the advancement of the nation" (p. 22). Basing 
quotas on these 1920 figures enabled Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland in 1929 to receive an annual quota of 65,721 persons a year, in 
contrast to 2,784 for Russia, and 5,802 for Italy (pp. 28-29 table 1 . 1) .  
But the 1924 Act did not actually consider the entire population of 
the United States. Rather, whites were the only population counted 
for purposes of developing national quotas. The law stipulated that 
"'inhabitants in the continental United States in 1920' does not include 
(1) immigrants from the [Western Hemisphere] or their descendants, 
(2) aliens ineligible for citizenship or their descendants, (3) the 
descendants of slave immigrants, or (4) the descendants of the 
American aborigines" (p. 26). Thus, the "colored races" were erased 
from the history of national origins of America (p. 27).11 
This is how the United States largely closed its doors to the 
undesirable races of Southern and Eastern Europe, while 
simultaneously drawing a color line around Europe, not through it (p. 
17). Thus while erecting a hierarchy of difference within Europe, the 
Johnson-Reed Immigration Act also asserted an American race 
entirely made up of European descendants. 
Formally, the quota system encompassed all countries in the world, 
except for the Western Hemisphere, which was exempted due to 
American diplomatic and trade interests with Canada and Mexico and 
the need for agricultural labor from Mexico (p. 50). All countries in 
the Eastern Hemisphere received the minimum quota of one hundred 
persons. At the same time, the 1924 Act excluded from immigration 
those deemed to be "aliens ineligible for citizenship."12 Even though 
11. See also Roger Daniels, Two Cheers for Immigration, in ROGER DANIELS & OTIS 
GRAHAM, DEBATING AMERICAN IMMIGRATION: 1882-PRESENT 22 (2001) (noting these 
omissions in the 1924 Act in defining American national identity). 
12. The first federal citizenship statute, passed by Congress in 1790, limited 
naturalization to "free white" aliens. Act of March 26, 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103. This was 
amended to permit naturalization of "aliens of African nativity" or "African descent" in 
1870. Act of July 14, 1870, ch. 254, sec. 7, 16 Stat. 254. From 1870 until 1952, when the racial 
bar on naturalization was entirely lifted, there was considerable litigation. Most persons 
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China, for example, received a quota of one hundred, the only persons 
eligible to emigrate from China were non-Chinese persons (p. 27). We 
can see here the mechanisms that shaped U.S. demographics so that 
pundits like Peter Brimelow, author of the best-selling book, Alien 
Nation, allege that the "ethnic core" of the United States - to which 
he argues that we must return - has been white.13 It bears mention 
that if the United States had enjoyed immigration unfettered by racial 
exclusion, presuming that immigrants entered in proportion to their 
world populations, we would experience a very different national 
identity, given that over one-half of the world's population is Asian. 
What Ngai also carefully shows is something that seems quite 
paradoxical: how these numerical restrictions, which did not apply to 
the Western Hemisphere, nonetheless created illegal immigration 
from Mexico. She argues that numerical restriction created a new class 
of persons in the national body, in the form of illegal aliens (p. 57). 
Before the 1920s, few immigrants were deported.14 Deportation 
functioned as a corrective to exclusion; in other words, if a person 
should not have lawfully entered, and was caught in an asylum or 
hospital or prison, they might be deported.15 Thus, in 1891, Congress 
authorized the deportation of aliens who within one year of arrival 
became public charges from causes existing prior to landing, in other 
words, causes that would have kept them from entry in the first place. 
Deportation did not have its own substantive grounds. And note that 
the federal government did not have an unlimited time within which to 
act. It was, in fact, considered unconscionable to deport an immigrant 
denied naturalization as racially ineligible were Asian. See IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY 
LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996). 
13. PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S 
IMMIGRATION DISASTER 10 (1995). For critical reviews of Alien Nation, see Kevin R. 
Johnson, Fear of an "Alien Nation": Race, Immigration, and Immigrants, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y 
REV. 111 (1996); Hiroshi Motomura, Whose Alien Nation?: Two Models of Constitutional 
Immigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927 (1996); Peter H. Schuck, Alien Rumination, 105 
YALE L.J. 1963 (1996). 
14. I am referring here to deportation by the federal government. For discussions of the 
history of expulsion by state and local authorities of individuals for reasons of crime, 
poverty, and disease, see generally Kunal Parker, Making Blacks Foreigners: The Legal 
Construction of Former Slaves in Post-Revolutionary Massachusetts, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 75, 
and Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-I875), 93 
COLUM. L. REV. 1833 (1993). 
15. P. 59. Historically, a noncitizen denied admission at a port of entry was said to be 
"excluded"; those expelled from the interior, whether lawfully present or not, were 
"deported." Entry into the United States is no longer the dividing line. The Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 replaced both exclusion and 
deportation with the word "removal," made the dividing line as to whether one was subject 
to grounds of deportability or excludability the question not of entry but of lawful admission, 
and thus specified that persons present in the interior without lawful admission were to be 
treated like those denied admission at a port of entry. For a discussion of this shift, see 
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 3, 380-81 (3d ed. 
2002). 
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after he had settled and begun to assimilate. The Immigration Act of 
1917 extended the statute of limitation on deportation from one year 
to five years from arrival (p. 59). 
The Johnson-Reed Immigration Act of 1924 both eliminated the 
statute of limitation on deportation and created separate grounds for 
deportation (p. 60). Significantly, the Immigration Service was now 
authorized to deport at any time any person who entered without a 
valid visa or without valid inspection (p. 60). The 1924 Act also 
established, for the first time, a land border patrol. In addition, 
unauthorized entry became a criminal, as well as a deportable, offense 
(p. 60). Thus, the new numerical restrictions on legal immigration 
required a concomitant enforcement apparatus, which led to new 
surveillance and new ways of thinking about immigration and unlawful 
entry. This enforcement apparatus coincided with the creation of the 
illegal alien; they were mutually produced. 
By the late 1920s, deportation was becoming an expensive 
proposition. To make expulsion more efficient, the Immigration 
Service allowed illegal aliens without criminal records to depart 
voluntarily (p. 60). Aliens without a proper visa became the largest 
single class of deportees and accounted for over half of formal 
deportations and the overwhelming majority of such voluntary 
departures by the late 1920s (p. 60). 
And here we see the seeds of the fusion of the illegal alien with the 
criminal alien, which continues to this day. Entry without a visa meant, 
in the words of the Immigration Service, that the "first act upon 
reaching our shores [is] to break our laws by entering in a clandestine 
manner" (p. 61 ). The illegal alien was presumed to have general 
criminal tendencies, because he had broken the law through illegally 
entering. In the words of one INS official, "[b]ecause the 'wetback' 
starts out by violating a law, . . .  it is easier and sometimes appears 
even more necessary for him to break other laws since he considers 
himself to be an outcast, even an outlaw" (p. 149). This equating of 
"illegal" in the immigration sense with "criminal" coincided with the 
racialization of the illegal alien as Mexican and with the concomitant 
construction of all Mexicans as both illegal and criminal. Thus, we can 
see how processes of territorial and administrative enforcement that 
were not, in the first instance, motivated by or defined by race 
produced presumptions about race (p. 63). 
The perception of the "illegal alien" as Mexican was born at a time 
when there were no numerical limits on immigration from Mexico. 
Until 1919, Mexicans were allowed to enter freely; after that time they 
were required to apply for admission at ports of entry and subjected to 
entry requirements such as a head tax and visa fee (p. 64). Those who 
sought to avoid the requirements, or feared denial of admission, 
entered without inspection and became illegal immigrants. The 
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enforcement of immigration restrictions - through. inspection 
procedures, deportation, the Border Patrol, and criminal prosecution 
- created many thousands of illegal Mexican immigrants (p. 71). 
The Border Patrol was originally formed to deter Chinese, who 
were generally barred from entry,16 and Europeans of excludable 
classes who sought entry through Canada (p. 64). But the Border 
Patrol gained its identity along the U.S.-Mexico border, assuming the 
character of criminal pursuit, although charged with civil law 
enforcement. In Ngai's words, the Border Patrol "raised the border" 
(p. 68). Through their acts, the border was rearticulated as a cultural 
and racial boundary and as a creator of illegal immigration. 
Ngai shows how Europeans were unmade as illegal, even while 
walking or wading across the U.S.-Mexico border became the 
quintessential act of illegal immigration. Increasing enforcement 
against Europeans created a groundswell for some immigration 
reform after European immigrants began to experience the legal 
machinery of very limited or nonexistent due process or judicial 
review that was developed for Chinese immigrants.17 In 1933 and 1934, 
legislation was introduced to grant waivers to deportation in cases 
where immigrants were considered deserving (p. 81). As Ngai points 
out, the prototypical story told by reformers to exemplify the need for 
such reform involved the "poor man's theft" of bread or a sack of coal, 
where the immigrant committed the original crime for a family who 
now would suffer because of his looming deportation (p. 80). Not 
surprisingly, those considered deserving were primarily Europeans 
with criminal records (p. 82). Mexicans apprehended without proper 
documents were not (p. 82). And the administrative policies allowing 
illegal immigrants to evade deportation were either exclusively 
restricted to Europeans or implemented for their primary benefit.18 
Europeans caught illegally in the United States could follow a 
procedure known as pre-examination. The program allowed 
Europeans to take voluntary departure to Canada, obtain a visa for 
permanent residence from the U.S. consul there, and then reenter as 
legal immigrants. Asians did not qualify for the program, as they were 
categorically excluded from immigration on grounds of racial 
16. Excepted from Chinese exclusion were merchants, students, teachers, tourists, treaty 
traders, and diplomats. Ngai, p. 204. For a discussion of Chinese immigration during the 
period of exclusion, see ERIKA LEE, AT AMERICA'S GATES: CHINESE IMMIGRATION 
DURING THE EXCLUSION ERA: 1882-1943, at 45 (2003). 
17. As Ngai mentions, Justice Brewer's dissent in Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 
U.S. 693 (1893), was prescient. He noted that while today the absolute power of the state to 
expel unwanted aliens was "directed only against the obnoxious Chinese; but if the power 
exists, who shall say it will not be exercised to-morrow against other classes and other 
people?" P. 76 (quoting Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 743). 
18. See discussion, infra pp. 108-09. Ngai writes: "Legislative and administrative reforms 
operated in a way that fueled racial disparity in deportation practices." P. 82. 
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ineligibility; while one district director tried to grant pre-examination 
to Mexicans, he was stopped after 1938 (pp. 86-87). Between 1935 and 
1959, the INS processed nearly 58,000 cases and granted approval in 
the vast majority of them (p. 87). Thus, Europeans could convert their 
status from illegal aliens to lawful immigrants through pre­
examination. In addition, unlawful immigrants could become lawful 
through suspension of deportation. Suspension of deportation was 
discretionary relief which could be granted to aliens of "good moral 
character" if deportation would result in "serious economic 
detriment" to the alien's immediate family. The INS suspended the 
deportations of several thousand aliens a year from 1941 to the late 
1950s (p. 88). While there was no bar to suspending the deportation of 
Mexicans, Ngai notes an internal Justice Department study that 
indicated that European immigrants constituted the majority of those 
whose deportation was suspended.19 Lastly, the Registry Act, which 
legalized the status of "honest law-abiding alien[s] who may be in the 
country under some merely technical irregularity" upon the payment 
of a twenty dollar fee if they could show continuous residence since 
1921 and "good moral character," primarily benefited Europeans and 
Canadians.20 Ngai estimates that between 1925 and 1965 some 200,000 
illegal European immigrants successfully legalized their status through 
these three mechanisms (p. 89). 
This selective forgiving of the illegal status of European 
immigrants is hidden in our history. Its absence from the history books 
coincides with the presumption of legal European and illegal Mexican 
that is absolutely foundational to our national identity. The illegal 
immigrant, presumptively Mexican, functions as the opposite to the 
European immigrant, presumed to be legal and on the path towards 
citizenship. Europeans have, through the processes Ngai describes, 
become entirely legitimated as the center of American citizenship, 
while Mexicans have been cast over the borders, as having no rightful 
claim of belonging.21 
Mexican Americans were literally cast over the borders in the form 
of "repatriation" programs of the Great Depression, whereby 
authorities removed over 400,000 Mexicans from the Southwest and 
19. Seventy-three percent of 389 randomly selected suspension cases in a study 
conducted by the Justice Department in 1943 involved Europeans; eight percent involved 
Mexicans. P. 88. This is an admittedly small sample. 
20. The Registry Act "did not formally favor Europeans over Mexicans," p. 82, but of 
the 115,000 immigrants who registered between 1930 and 1940, 80 percent were European or 
Canadian. P. 82. Many Mexicans qualified but "few knew about it, understood it, or could 
afford the fee." P. 82. 
21. Arguably, Mexicans are considered to "belong" in the United States, but as cheap 
and flexible labor rather than as citizens. 
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Midwest in the early 1930s. An estimated sixty percent of the 
"repatriates" were children or American citizens by birth (p. 72). The 
repatriations were a mix of voluntary departures, deportations by the 
INS, and organized removals by local welfare bureaus seeking to expel 
unwanted Mexicans from their jurisdictions (p. 73). The identity of 
Mexicans in the United States has been so fused with foreignness, 
illegality, and nonbelonging that U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry 
could be evicted in a racial expulsion program, exceeded in scale only 
by the American Indian removals of the nineteenth century (p. 75), 
under the rubric of "repatriation" - as if Mexican Americans were 
Mexican nationals.22 
The nineteenth-century conquest of Mexico's Northern Territories 
by the United States, leading to the assertion "[W]e didn't cross the 
border, the border crossed us,"23 highlights the strangeness of the 
presumptive illegality of Mexicans in the United States. As Ngai 
explains, the casting of Mexicans as foreign was accomplished not only 
by the immigration enforcement described above, but also by the 
context of the political economy of the U.S. Southwest. Conquest of a 
population considered subordinate and inassimilable, and desirable 
primarily as imported and cheap labor, led to Mexicans being 
racialized as foreign in a land now considered to belong to white 
Americans. 
The Southwest was dominated by agricultural growers who desired 
large numbers of Mexican laborers, considered more malleable and 
vulnerable than the settled resident workforce. Even though most 
Anglos to the region were migrants, Mexicans, whether born in the 
United States or not, were considered foreign (p. 132). Foreignness 
stripped Mexicans of the claim of belonging as natives; instead, they 
were cast as illegitimate and inferior. Mexicans were racialized as 
disposable, as a one-dimensional "commodity function" (p. 132). 
Growers argued that they were suffering from a severe labor 
shortage as of the late 1930s and lobbied for the importation of 
Mexican nationals as contract laborers.24 Their success represented a 
22. For further discussion of the "repatriations" and of Mexican American and Mexican 
immigrant identity, see generally DAVID G. GUTIERREZ, WALLS AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN 
AMERICANS, MEXICAN IMMIGRANTS, AND THE POLmcs OF ETHNICITY (1995); for further 
discussion of the "repatriation" program and of contemporary efforts to seek redress, see 
Kevin R. Johnson, International Human Rights Class Actions: .New Frontiers for Group 
Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 643, 659-70 (2004). 
23. See Interview by Nie Paget-Clarke with Roberto Martinez, Director of the U.S. I 
Mexico Border Program in San Diego, Cal. (1997), in Immigration and Human Rights on the 
U.S.!Mexico Border (pt. 4), IN MOTION MAG., Sept. 14, 1997, at 
http://www.inmotionmagazine.com/border4.html. See Kim David Chanbonpin, How the 
Border Crossed Us: Filling the Gap Between Plume v. Seward and the Dispossession of 
Mexican Landowners in California After 1848, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 297 (2005). 
24. Contract labor stands "outside the free labor market." KITTY CALA vrr A, INSIDE 
THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE l.N.S. 21 (1992). The 
May 2005) Impossible Subjects 1605 
sharp break with past policy and practice, which had prohibited 
foreign contract labor. As Ngai indicates, since the Civil War, contract 
labor was likened to slavery and portrayed as the antithesis of the free 
labor on which democracy depended (p. 137). Like the enslaved 
person, the contract laborer was not free to bargain over wages and 
working conditions, and he had no ability to either choose his 
employment or to quit (p. 137-38). In 1885, Congress had passed the 
Foran Act, prohibiting the immigration of aliens into the United 
States under labor contracts made before their arrival.25 
Contract labor was considered so antithetical to the founding 
principles of American democracy that the practice was stopped in 
Hawai'i after its acquisition by the United States as a territory, and 
was never instituted in the Philippines or Puerto Rico under American 
colonial rule (p. 138). Yet within the mainland, the United States 
turned to a labor practice rejected in its own colonies in the form of 
the bracero program. The program required Congress to repeal the 
Foran Act.26 
Between 1942 and 1964, some 4.6 million Mexicans entered the 
United States and worked in twenty-six states. Lobbyists for the 
bracero program claimed it would provide farm laborers desperately 
needed for the war effort, with the side benefit of eliminating illegal 
immigration, all the while protecting foreign nationals from abuse (p. 
139). But the Mexican laborers who came in under the bracero 
program were largely unsuccessful in keeping wages or working or 
housing conditions at the contracted level (pp. 143-46). This is not 
surprising given that these workers had limited legal standing in the 
society in which they worked. Upwards of several thousand formal 
complaints were filed per year. Some voted with their feet. Desertion 
from the bracero program occurred at the rate of ten percent per year; 
by leaving the program, legal workers were transformed into illegal 
aliens. The program generated illegal immigration in another, 
contract laborer is not a waged employee. For a definition of the term "contract labor," see 
Leah F. Yosko, Legitimizing the Triangular Employment Relationship: Emerging 
International Labour Standards from a Comparative Perspective, 19 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y 
J. 43, 70 n.99 (1997). Yosko defines the term as "work performed for a natural or legal 
person . . .  under actual conditions of dependency on or subordination to [that person)." Id. 
(quoting International Labour Office, Eighty-Fifth Session of the International Labour 
Conference Provisional Record, Sixth Item on the Agenda: Contract Labour, para. 191.1 
(1997)). 
25. Precursors to this Act were the 1862 Act to Prohibit the Coolie Trade by American 
Citizens in Americ'an Vessels and the 1875 Page Act that targeted "coolies" as well. For a 
discussion of the 1862 Act, see Moon-Ho Jung, Outlawing 'Coolies': Race, Nation, and 
Empire in the Age of Emancipation 57 AMERICAN QUARTERLY (forthcoming 2005). 
26. P. 139. Smaller programs involved Puerto Ricans who, as "statutory citizens" would 
not be considered foreign labor, at least in theory, and workers from the British West Indies. 
P. 138. 
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unexpected way. Mexico had insisted on the exclusion of states that 
explicitly racially discriminated against Mexicans from the bracero 
program, namely Texas, Arkansas, and Missouri. Because growers in 
these states sought labor from Mexico as well, creating a powerful 
pull, recruitment of undocumented labor into these states soared (pp. 
147-48). These undocumented workers were labeled "wetbacks."27 
The simultaneous existence of bracero and illegal labor seemed to 
call for cracking down. Illegal immigration seemed more illegal when 
there was a legal method of procuring farm labor. As a result, the INS 
stepped up enforcement in the early 1950s with the infamous 
Operation Wetback that cleared hundreds of thousands of "wetbacks" 
from the United States by dumping them over the border. But Ngai's 
statistics make clear that this massive deportation did not forestall 
illegal immigration - at best it was a "short-term success" (p. 156). 
For the duration of the bracero program, both bracero and illegal 
labor continued to coexist, and the existence of the bracero program 
seems to have generated illegal immigration, both through defections 
from the program and through recruitment by growers of 
undocumented labor. 
Illegal immigration has not ended, as we know. Ngai argues that 
illegal immigration has persisted due to the continued and extended 
reach of numerical restriction on legal immigration. Again, this is a 
claim that on first blush may seem counterfactual, but Ngai's analysis 
is entirely persuasive. The 1965 Hart-Celler Immigration Act, lauded 
as overturning racial discrimination, did not repeal the idea of quotas 
in immigration. Rather, immigration reform was narrowed to the 
question of formal equality, in terms of apportioning the same number 
of slots for each country. On some level, formal equality - given the 
history of explicit racial preferences - is understandably appealing. 
Ngai suggests that formal equality was desirable as well in terms of the 
American image abroad during the Cold War era; formal equality 
between countries sent a very visible signal that the United States did 
not discriminate between sending states nor among the national 
origins of its population. But, as she asserts, substantive equality -
which would have suggested different-sized quotas for countries with 
different needs or sizes, or with specific historical relations with the 
27. The term "wetback" referred to Mexicans who had illegally crossed the Rio Grande 
into the United States. See Kevin R. Johnson, "Aliens" and the U.S. Immigration Laws: The 
Social and Legal Construction of Nonpersons, 28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 263, 283 n.92 
(1996-97). 
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United States - was not mandated by Cold War civil rights28 and was 
not a subject of reform.29 
Remember that the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico, had 
been subject to no national origin quotas under the 1924 Immigration 
Act.30 A quota of 120,000 for the entire Western Hemisphere went 
into effect in 1968. In 1976, an annual country quota of 20,000 on 
Mexico was implemented. We can track the relation between this 
numerical restriction of legal immigration from Mexico and illegal 
immigration. In the early 1960s, the annual legal migration of 
Mexicans to the United States approximated 200,000 braceros and 
35,000 admissions for permanent residence. The number of 
deportations of undocumented Mexicans increased by forty percent in 
1968 (the year the 120,000 quota for the Western Hemisphere was 
implemented) to 151,000. In 1976 (the year the 20,000 country quota 
for Mexico was implemented), the INS expelled 781,000 Mexicans 
from the United States. Meanwhile, the total number of 
apprehensions for all other nationals in the world, combined, 
remained below 100,000 a year (p. 261). 
Thus, Ngai shows how illegal immigration from Mexico was 
produced. The uniformity of our national origins quota system, 
providing the same per-country quota regardless of nonuniform 
national populations, needs, and histories, is responsible for the 
existence of "illegal aliens," along with administrative enforcement 
produced through national immigration restriction and policies that 
selectively turned illegal immigrants into lawful ones. Ngai thus issues 
a sharp critique to the conventional understanding of the lifting of 
national origins quotas. The end to the national origins quotas is 
generally lauded as a civil rights victory,31 as the closure to an ugly 
history of race-based immigration exclusion.32 But Ngai challenges us 
to consider what it has meant to lift national origins quotas while 
28. P. 245. Ngai refers here to MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND 
THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 11-17 (2000). Dudziak's research demonstrates 
that Cold War liberals believed that granting African Americans formal equality was 
important to America's image abroad, but that substantive equality was not required. P. 245. 
29. On formal versus substantive equality in the context of civil rights, see Kimberle 
Crenshaw et al., Introduction, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT 
INFORMED THE MOVEMENT xiii (Kimberle Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995). 
30. See supra p. 105. Of course, administrative means - for example, barring Mexicans 
from entry when they were considered likely to become a public charge - were used during 
that period to cut down on the number of lawful entries. 
31. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, The Civil Rights Revolution Comes to Immigration Law: A 
New Look at the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, 75 N.C. L. REV. 273 (1996). 
32. See Schuck, supra note 13, at 1966 (stating that "racism as such no longer plays a 
crucial role in immigration law; certainly it plays a less significant role than it did before 
1965"). 
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simultaneously maintaining numerical restrictions. Given the history 
of conquest of Mexico by the United States, the contiguous border 
between Mexico and the United States, and the disparate economic 
conditions between the two countries, it is no wonder that more 
Mexicans seek to enter than are lawfully admitted. A true civil rights 
victory might have recognized that substantive equality, in the form of 
a larger per-country quota, would have been necessary to permit more 
legal immigration from Mexico.33 
Ngai's historical analysis proves helpful to recent discussions about 
implementing a guest-worker program. In January 2004, President 
George W. Bush unveiled an immigration reform proposal under the 
title "Fair and Secure Immigration Reform." In his announcement he 
stated, "[a)s a Texan, I have known many immigrant families, mainly 
from Mexico, and I have seen what they add to our country."34 He 
described lives risked in "dangerous desert border crossings" and lives 
entrusted to "the brutal rings of heartless human smugglers."35 This, 
he said is "wrong" and "not the American way."36 Explicitly wrapping 
the proposal in the language of family values, he referred to families 
being separated by immigration law and stated that "family values do 
not end at the Rio Grande border."37 Common sense and fairness, 
he asserted, demand that we allow workers to fill jobs Americans are 
not filling. 
The proposal consisted of a temporary-worker program that would 
match "willing foreign workers" with "willing U.S. employers" when 
"no Americans can be found to fill the jobs."38 As proposed by Bush, 
jobs would be open to both workers overseas and undocumented 
individuals within the United States. Workers would receive a three-
33. The impact of uniform per-country quotas has also led to long waits for 
potential immigrants from certain countries, especially Mexico, India and the Philippines, 
given the larger number of persons seeking family-sponsored immigration visas 
from those countries. See Immigrant Numbers for January 2005, VISA BULL., 
(U.S. Dep't of State, Wash., D.C.), Dec. 8, 2004, at http://travel.state. 
gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulletin_2007.html. According to the Bulletin, the current wait for a 
U.S. citizen seeking to sponsor a brother or sister from most countries is about twelve years. 
Id. For India, the wait is twelve and a half years; for the Philippines, the wait is more than 
twenty-two years. 
34. Press Release, White House, President Bush Proposes New Temporary 
Worker Program: Remarks by the President on Immigration Policy (Jan. 7, 2004), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040107-3.html. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick, Republicans Squaring Off Over Bush Plan on 
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at A19. 
38. See Fact Sheet, White House, Fact Sheet: Fair and Secure Immigration Reform 
(Jan. 7, 2004), at http://www. hitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/0l/print/20040107-1.html 
[hereinafter Fact Sheet]; see also Anne Heavey Scheinfeldt, President Bush Proposes New 
Temporary Worker Program, 18  GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 429 (2004). 
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year, temporary legal status that was renewable, and that would not 
automatically lead to legal permanent residence.39 At the same time, 
Bush noted that some workers might "pursue American citizenship," 
which they would need to apply for "in the normal way," and without 
gaining "unfair advantage over people who have followed legal 
procedures from the start."40 
Reaction was swift, and criticism fell across a broad spectrum,41 
ranging from the claim that the program launched a "new era of 
indentured servants" to condemnation of the program as a "reward" 
to "illegal aliens."42 Despite Bush's explicit statements, some saw the 
guest-worker program as an amnesty program that could benefit as 
many as eight million illegal immigrants.43 Some critics expressed 
concern that "illegal aliens" were going "unpunished";44 others decried 
the likelihood that this "temporary" program could become 
"permanent."45 One way the program was thought to be non­
temporary was through the possibility of children of the temporary 
workers enjoying birthright citizenship.46 In one gruesome response, a 
columnist and talk show host called for sterilization of temporary 
workers to ensure the program remained temporary.47 
Critics who feared the program would not accrue to the benefit of 
vulnerable immigrants pointed out that this was a classic guest-worker 
program that instead of giving workers "hope," merely gave workers a 
39. See Fact Sheet, supra note 38. 
40. See Scheinfeldt, supra note 38, at 429-30. 
41. For the rare laudatory view, see Regina Germain, Perspectives on the Bush 
Administration's Immigrant Guestworker Proposal: The Time For Immigration Reform ls 
Now, 32 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 747 (2004). 
42. See Patricia Medige, Perspectives on the Bush Administration's New Immigrant 
Guestworker Proposal: Immigrant Labor Issues, 32 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 735, 737 
(2004). 
43. See Joseph Curl, Bush's "Guest-Worker" Proposal on a Back Burner, WASH. TIMES, 
Sept. 1, 2004, at AlO. 
44. In the words of one commentator, "millions of illegal aliens who are using fake or 
stolen Social Security numbers would face no penalty and could remain in the country for an 
unspecified number of years." Id. 
45. Editorial, Flaws in Bush's Immigration Plan, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 2004, at BS. 
46. See Bush "Guest Worker" Program to Be "Open to Any Type of Employee," 
LONEWACKO, Jan. 28, 2004, at http://www.tolstoy.com/lonewacko/blog/archives/000943.html 
(describing the statement of Margaret Spellings at a Cato Institute panel that children of 
"guest workers" would automatically become citizens if born in the United States). 
47. Jane Chastain, a columnist and talk show host stated: 
[T)he only way to assure the American people that this "temporary" status truly is 
temporary is to seal up the wombs - sterilize - those who apply for guest-worker status. 
Or else change the law that grants citizenship to anyone who is born here regardless of the 
status of his or her parents. 
http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/default.aspx?oid=l3565. 
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job,48 at the end of which they faced removal. Others called the 
program an "immigration trap."49 For undocumented workers within 
the United States, identifying oneself to the Department of Homeland 
Security in order to secure a temporary-worker visa would mean 
providing sufficient information to facilitate deportation if that worker 
remained beyond the end of the program and did not qualify to stay 
under another immigration category.50 The program, open not just to 
agricultural employers but to any employer seeking low-wage overseas 
labor, was decried as importing into the United States "Wal-Mart 
bracero[s],"51 and raised concerns about the effect of a massive influx 
of temporary workers on the wages and working conditions of 
American workers.52 
Others evaluated the program based upon their assessment of its 
relationship to the problem of illegal immigration. Some asserted that 
the first order of business was to secure the borders, and then to 
develop a guest-worker plan.53 Others claimed that a guest-worker 
plan would in fact help reduce illegal immigration. The Cato Institute 
claimed that a look at history would indicate that the bracero program 
and illegal immigration were inversely correlated during the time of 
the program's existence.54 But the history noted in Ngai's book 
indicates that the bracero program and illegal immigration were not 
inversely correlated, but bore a tautological relationship to one 
another.55 Illegal immigration only exists in relationship to legal 
48. See David Abraham, American Jobs but Not the American Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
9, 2004, at A19 (also pointing out the possible effects on wages and working conditions). 
49. See Bill Ong Hing, Legal Status: Amnesty or Deportation Trap?, CHI . TRIB., Jan. 9, 
2004, at 17. 
50. Id.; see also Christina B. LaBrie, President Bush Proposes a New Temporary Worker 
Program (Cyrus D. Mehta & Assoc., New York, N.Y.), Jan. 9, 2004, at 
http://www.cyrusmehta.com1print_news_articles.asp?news_id=937. 
51. Medige, supra note 42, at 735. 
52. For earlier scholarship on this point, see Enid Trucios-Haynes, Temporary Workers 
and Future immigration Policy Conflicts: Protecting U.S. Workers and Satisfying the Demand 
for Global Human Capital, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 967 (2002). 
53. In the words of Representative Tom Tancredo: "The president must understand that 
without first securing our borders from the mass flow of illegal immigration, any guest­
worker plan is totally unworkable." Sergio Bustos, Bush to Seek Guest Worker Law, 
TUCSON CITIZEN, Nov. 10, 2004, at http://www.tucsoncitizen.com. 
54. The Cato Institute's Daniel Griswold recently asserted that the "response" to rising 
illegal immigration from Mexico was to dramatically increase temporary worker visas under 
the bracero program; the result was an equally dramatic decline in illegal immigration. 
Daniel Griswold, Immigration: Beyond the Barbed Wire (Cato Inst., Wash., D.C.), Dec. 7, 
2004, at http://www.cato.org/dailys/12-07-04.html. 
55. For the argument that Bush's proposal would likely lead to an increase in 
unauthorized workers, see Philip Martin, Does the U.S. Need a New Bracero Program?, 9 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 127 (2003). See also Philip Martin, AgJOBS: New Solution 
or New Problem? (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). 
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immigration. In contrast to the vision of illegal immigrants waiting 
outside U.S. borders to enter, illegal immigration is produced through 
government regulation demarcating who is legal and who is not. The 
border between illegal and legal is mutable, depending upon where 
the state decides to draw the line between the two categories, and 
depending upon who the state allows to shift from one category to 
another. Thus, the idea that there are fixed and identifiable 
populations of legal and illegal immigrants who will choose to enter or 
not enter the United States in response to a particular policy does not 
make sense. 
The outcry over a temporary-worker program highlights the 
contradictions between U.S. capital's need for cheap labor and the 
political imperative of the nation-state.56 The desire for cheap labor in 
the form of temporary overseas workers stands in opposition to a 
liberal democratic state identified as the guarantor of rights.57 Mexican 
immigration has been seen as a "uniquely elastic supply of labor"58 in 
the structural contradictions that exist between the economic utility of 
immigrants as cheap labor and the political and fiscal costs imposed by 
nurturing a surplus labor supply.59 The historical bracero program was 
an attempt to institutionalize and routinize this flexible labor;60 the 
Bush proposal attempts the same. 
Some critics would charge that we must acknowledge that we 
already have an informal "guest-worker program" made up of 
disposable workers in the form of undocumented immigrants. 61 At the 
same time, we already have a legally authorized "guest-worker 
program" in the form of temporary-worker programs that have gone 
largely ignored in the public debate about Bush's proposal.62 These are 
56. See LISA LOWE, IMMIGRANT ACTS: ON ASIAN AMERICAN CULTURAL POLITICS 15  
(1996) (describing the contradiction of  the capital imperative and the political imperative of 
the U.S. nation-state). 
57. Id. 
58. CALAVITA, supra note 24, at 180. 
59. Id. at 179. 
60. Id. at 180. 
61. This was a comment made repeatedly at the Association of American Law Schools 
Annual Meeting program organized by the Section on Immigration and Section on Labor 
and Employment Law, titled Guest Worker Programs: Proposals and Perspectives, Golden 
Gate Law School, Jan. 5, 2005. 
62. Pending now in Congress is the Agricultural Job Opportunity, Benefits, and Security 
Act of 2005, S. 359, H.R. 884, 109th Cong. (2005) [hereinafter AgJobs], sponsored by 
Senators Larry Craig and Edward Kennedy and Representatives Howard Berman and Chris 
Cannon. AgJobs contains an explicit legalization provision for agricultural workers, through 
a new concept called "earned legalization." For a discussion of AgJobs, including a 
description of its provisions and an analysis of why it was not passed in the past, see Lauren 
Gilbert, Fields of Hope, Fields of Despair: Legisprudential and Historic Perspectives on the 
Aglobs Bill of 2003, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. (forthcoming Summer 2005). Under earned 
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the H-2A program for agricultural workers and the H-2B program for 
non-agricultural and low-skilled workers.63 Both programs proffer 
nonimmigrant visas that bear no relationship to permanent residence 
or citizenship.64 In the fiscal year 2002, a total of 102,615 workers were 
admitted into the United States for temporary work under these 
programs, primarily under the H-2B program.65 The H-2A program 
has historically been very small, issuing less than 40,000 visas per year 
in an industry that is estimated to employ up to four million workers 
annually.66 
One question that must be asked is whether it would be accurate to 
raise the specter of a new bracero program in the form of Bush's 
temporary-worker proposal, when the H-2A program is a temporary 
agricultural worker program that is generally acknowledged as the 
legacy of the bracero program.67 In fact, the H-2A program has been 
called the "New Bracero Program."68 Certainly, the failure of Bush to 
numerically limit the program in his announcement fueled reaction by 
critics seeking to curb illegal immigration or to stop immigration 
altogether. Similarly, these critics were motivated by the presumption 
that the program would lead to legalization. But for those who 
charged that Bush's proposal must be condemned as a guest-worker 
program, why has the H-2A program escaped the onslaught of recent 
criticism ?69 
legalization, applicants must prove a past history of agricultural work in the United States 
(at least 200 days in the previous year), then register and continue to work in agriculture 
during a subsequent period (at least 360 more days in the next six years). If AgJobs were 
ever enacted, the law would provide the opportunity for up to 500,000 agricultural workers 
to legalize. See Fact Sheet, Nat'! Council of La Raza, Fact Sheet: Agricultural Jobs 
Opportunity, Benefits, and Security Act of 2003 (AgJOBS), at 
http://www.nclr.org/content/publications/download/2609 (last visited Mar. 6, 2005). 
63. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a)-(b) (2000). 
64. For a comparison of these programs, see Alice J. Baker, Agricultural Guestworker 
Programs in the United States, 10 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL'Y 79 (2004), and Medige, supra note 
42. 
65. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2002 
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 1 18-19 tbl.26 (2003), fhereinafter 2002 
YEARBOOK] (documenting nonimmigrants admitted by class of admission, selected fiscal 
years 1985-2002), at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statisticsffEMP02yrbk/ 
Temp2002.pdf. 
66. See Another Bracero Program Considered, RURAL MIGRATION NEWS, at 
http://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=30_0_ 4_0 (last visited April 8, 2005). 
67. See Beth Lyon, When More "Security" Equals Less Workplace Safety: Reconsidering 
U.S. Laws that Disadvantage Unauthorized Workers, 6 U. PA. LAB. & EMP. L. 571, 588 
(2004). 
68. See Maria L. Ontiveros, Lessons From the Fields: Female Farmworkers and the Law, 
55 ME. L. REV. 157, 161 (2003). 
69. For a critique of the H-2A program, see Laura C. Oliveira, A License to Exploit: The 
Need to Reform the H-2A Temporary Agricultural Guest Worker Program, 5 SCHOLAR 153 
(2002). 
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One response to the Bush proposal, coming from David 
Limbaugh, columnist and brother of radio talk show host Rush 
Limbaugh, raised divergent concerns. He asked: 
And why are we even talking about fairness in the same breath with 
illegal aliens? Do we owe them a duty of fairness? . . . What many 
opponents of loose immigration fear is not the influx of foreigners in 
American society, nor the immigrants themselves, who can't be blamed 
for wanting a better life and who would likely welcome assimilation into 
our culture. Rather, it is the deliberate destruction of the unique 
American culture and American civilization by 'multiculturalists. '70 
To understand the connection made by Limbaugh between illegal 
aliens and the destruction of American culture and civilization by 
multiculturalists, we can tum to Samuel Huntington, who links 
multiculturalist criticism of American identity with illegal immigration 
in his new book Who Are We. In his book, Huntington argues that the 
United States ignores the failure of Mexicans to assimilate into 
mainstream U.S. culture at the nation's peril.71 America, says 
Huntington, was created by settlers who were overwhelmingly white, 
British and Protestant. With the "achievements of the civil rights 
movement and the Nationality Act of 1965," race "virtually 
disappeared" as a defining component of national identity.72 Instead, 
American identity is defined in terms of "culture and creed" - whose 
bedrock remains the Anglo-Protestant culture of the founding 
settlers.73 This culture, laments Huntington, came under assault in the 
late twentieth century by the doctrines of multiculturalism and 
diversity, the rise of group identities based on race, ethnicity, and 
gender, the effect of transnational diasporas and immigrants with dual 
loyalties, and the growing salience of cosmopolitan identities.74 But the 
greatest challenge today comes from "the immense and continuing 
immigration from Latin America, especially from Mexico, and the 
fertility rates of these immigrants compared to black and white 
American natives. "75 
70. January: The Last Straw? Bush's Guest-Worker Gamble, RIGHT WING WATCH 
ONLINE, Jan. 23, 2004 (quoting David Limbaugh), at http://www.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/ 
default.aspx?oid=13565. 
71. HUNTINGTON, supra note 8; see also Samuel Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, 
FOREIGN POLICY, Mar./Apr. 2004, at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/files/story/2495. 
php. [hereinafter Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge]. 
72. Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, supra note 71, at 1 .  
73. HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at xv-xvi. 
74. Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, supra note 71, at 2. 
75. Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, supra note 71, at 2. For a response to 
Huntington's concern about fertility rates, see Mireya Navarro, For Younger Latinos, A Shift 
to Smaller Families, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2004, at Al. For multiple responses pointing out 
endemic factual misstatements in Huntington's book, see www.foreignpolicy.com. 
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There are numerous contradictions contained within Huntington's 
argument, for one, his argument that "race has disappeared" as a 
defining component of national identity, even while he seeks to limit 
national identity to the "Anglo-Protestant culture and creed."76 Here 
Huntington attempts to distinguish racial distinctions between people 
from racial distinctions between cultures. Because he focuses on 
cultures and not people, he believes he is not engaging in racial 
distinctions.77 But concerns about cultural difference serve as proxies 
for racial concerns about people.78 Presumptions about fitness for 
membership in the United States have always rested upon ideas about 
assimilability.79 In considering which immigrant cultures are capable of 
assimilation into the United States, Huntington stereotypes cultures in 
a fashion that will leave many readers incredulous, for example, he 
states that Anglo-Protestant culture, unlike Mexican culture, values 
hard work.80 Thus, he can argue that he does not object to Mexican 
people, per se, but only to Mexican cultural values. Obviously, 
whether one considers hard work a Mexican or Anglo-Protestant 
cultural value depends upon whom one centers as the prototypical 
Mexican or Anglo-Protestant. The fact that Huntington can disparage 
a monolithic - and mythical - Mexican culture as not valuing hard 
work shows that race remains a defining component of his analysis 
through a hierarchy of cultures. 
For our purposes in this Review, let us focus on Huntington's 
discussion of "illegality" as a factor differentiating Mexican 
immigration from past and most other contemporary immigration to 
the United States. He writes: 
Substantial illegal entry into the United States is a post-1965 and 
Mexican phenomenon. For almost a century after the Constitution was 
adopted, illegal immigration was virtually impossible: no national laws 
restricted or prohibited immigration, and only a few states imposed 
modest limits. During the following ninety years, illegal immigration was 
minimal: control of immigrants coming by ship was fairly easy, and a 
good proportion of those arriving at Ellis Island were denied entry. The 
1 965 immigration law, the increased availability of transportation, and 
76. HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at xvii. 
77. Id. 
78. For the argument that culture is the terrain on which racism is most often today 
expressed, see Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, and the Politics of 
Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1600-04 (1996). 
79. For a discussion of the way in which cultural difference is both presumed and 
exaggerated, so that immigrants of color are described as inassimilable into Western norms, 
in particular in the context of gendered treatment, see id., Leti Volpp, Blaming Culture for 
Bad Behavior, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 89 (2000), and Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus 
Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1 181 (2001). 
80. Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, supra note 71, at 12. 
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the intensified forces promoting Mexican emigration drastically changed 
this situation.81 
But Impossible Subjects shows us the many errors in Huntington's 
claim. Illegal entry became a phenomenon not after 1965, but in the 
1920s. Illegal immigration before that period was "minimal" and 
"easily controlled" not because fewer immigrants were seeking entry 
but because there were fewer laws that made immigrants illegal as well 
as less surveillance. Illegal immigration post 1965 is perceived as a 
"Mexican" problem because assigning Mexico only 20,000 annual slots 
for lawful immigration has rendered illegal a large proportion of the 
Mexican population that sought entry. And the achievements of the 
1965 Immigration Act hardly include making race disappear as a 
defining component of national identity. Instead, its formal equality 
against a background of unequal distributions of wealth and 
opportunity allow illegal immigration to be defined as "Mexican." 
Moreover, if  Huntington is  concerned with illegal immigration, he 
might consider the phenomenon of visa overstayers, who make up 
one-third of all undocumented immigrants in the United States,82 and 
contemplate the history - and present day phenomenon - of white 
illegal immigrants.83 
In Ngai's words, the illegal alien is an "impossible subject" - a 
"person who cannot be" - as a person whose very identity is defined 
through the illegality of his existence (p. 5). And the illegal alien is 
also an "impossible subject," as a "problem that cannot be solved." (p. 
5). But Impossible Subjects shows us how the distinction between legal 
and illegal immigration came into being, which might give us hope that 
there may be ways to think creatively about illegal immigration as a 
problem. Yet we also see the hardened nature of the racialization of 
the "illegal alien," which might make us despair. Illegal and legal are 
mutable categories in immigration law. But the link between race and 
"illegal alien" seems immutable. As Louis Menand has written, the 
characterizations of immigrants as "legal" and "illegal" are not only 
81. HUNTINGTON, supra note 8, at 225. 
82. See Homeland Security Overstay, supra note 7. 
83. Canada ranked in the top fifteen in a 2000 estimate by the INS of countries of origin 
of illegal immigrants; a previous 1996 study estimated the country to rank fourth. See Jack 
Jedwab, Canadian Aliens: The Numbers and Status of Our "Illegals" South of the Border, 
(Canadian-American Research Symposium on Immigration, Niagara Falls, Ont.) Apr. 26, 
2003, at http://www.acs-aec.ca/Polls/Poll29.pdf. While these individuals might be of any 
race, only 13.4% of Canadians are so-called "visible minorities." See James McCarten, 
Canada's Mosaic More Colourful, Crowded Than Ever, Candian Press, Jan. 21, 2003, 
available at http://65 .109. 70.118/sections.php ?op=viewarticle&artid= 1741. 
As a regional matter, in 1994, the largest community of undocumented persons in New 
York state was Italian, followed by Ecuadorian, Polish, Irish, and then Russian. See Jeff 
Yang & Karen Lam, Could it Happen Here?, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 6, 1994, at 14. 
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always subject to change, they also do not tell us anything about the 
desirability of the persons so constructed.84 In other words, we must 
maintain a consistent practice of disaggregating the notion of illegal 
immigration from its subsuming of particular individuals or entire 
racial groups. Centering the history of the European illegal alien may 
be helpful in this regard, in dislodging the racialization of the illegal 
alien. 
II. ALIEN CITIZENS 
If the "illegal alien" is racialized as Mexican, the generic "alien" is 
racialized as Asian. In contrast to the immigrant, who carries within 
herself that teleology of settlement, assimilation, and citizenship, the 
alien is not presumed to be able to access lawful admission,85 let alone 
citizenship. The Asian is the quintessential alien. Asians were 
excluded from immigration in legislation first directed against 
Chinese, and then against the "barred Asiatic zone," stretching all the 
way from Afghanistan to the Pacific with the exceptions of Japan, 
which the State Department did not wish to offend, and the 
Philippines, which was a U.S. colony. In 1924 Asian exclusion was 
made complete with the statutory exclusion of Japanese, excluded 
along with all other aliens "ineligible to naturalize," fusing Asians into 
one unassimilable and undigestible race, and as utterly foreign to 
American national identity.86 
The citizen and the alien are oppositional terms; placing them 
together suggests a dissonance, an inappropriateness. The alien is not 
supposed to engage in citizenship.87 And the citizen can no longer be 
an alien. Thus the alien citizen also seems an "impossible subject. "88 
84. Menand is relying here upon Ngai's research. Louis Menand, Patriot Games: The 
New Nativism of Samuel P. Huntington, NEW YORKER, May 17, 2004, at 92. 
85. Just as I use the word "immigrant" more broadly than is technically appropriate 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act, here I use the word "alien" more broadly as 
well. Technically speaking, legal permanent residents are referred to as "aliens" in the Act. 
But in common parlance, legal permanent residents are more commonly referred to as 
"immigrants." By "alien" here I refer to the category of person who stands outside what 
Hiroshi Motomura would refer to as the "citizen-in-waiting," in other words, one who is 
racially removed from incorporation into the national citizenry. Motomura, supra note 2. 
86. Pp. 96-126. Filipinos were turned from nationals to aliens with the Tydings­
McDuffie Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-121, 48 Stat. 456, which granted the colony 
independence. Ngai's chapter 3, From Colonial Subject to Undesirable Alien: Filipino 
Migration in the Invisible Empire, explains how Filipinos occupied the anomalous status of 
American nationals, as subjects of a U.S. colony, from the U.S. acquisition of the Philippines 
in 1898 up to the point of transition to independence from the United States in 1934. She 
analyses Filipinos as experiencing a corporeality of contradictions: they experienced a 
colonialism that has been denied through the doctrine of American exceptionalism and they 
lived the contradiction between domestic racism and the assertion of the idea of benevolent 
assimilation. Id. at 96-126. 
87. See, e.g., Editorial, A Citizen's Right, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at A22 (suggesting 
that noncitizens not be allowed to vote in New York City). But see JENNIFER GORDON, 
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But "alien citizenship" does capture the particular racialization of 
Asian Americans.89 Although literal citizens, through naturalization, 
or through birth, and thus Americans in terms of formal legal 
citizenship, Asian Americans have historically not been considered 
Americans in terms of kinship, or belonging. The foreignness essential 
to the racialization of Asian Americans90 has operated to vitiate the 
notion that Asian Americans stand at the center of national 
membership. Thus, it may be useful to disaggregate the nation and 
state from each other in considering the relationship of racialization to 
the nation-state. Asians constituted as aliens had citizenship in neither 
state nor nation. Asian Americans, constituted as alien citizens, had 
citizenship in the state, but not the nation. This partial citizenship 
produced vulnerability when one's identity was not a matter of 
national indifference, but formed the very substance against which 
national identity coalesced.91 
Important to consider is the relationship between alien citizenship 
and ideas of gender and family.92 Contained within the normal 
trajectory of lawful permanent resident to citizen is the presumption 
of a normative heterosexual family.93 The Asian as alien has been cast 
SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS (2005) (mentioning the 
concept of "alien citizenship"); Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The 
Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 
1391 (1993) (documenting both historical and present-day noncitizen voting); Linda 
Bosniak, The Citizen and the Alien (2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) 
(elaborating on the concept of "alien citizenship"). 
88. I mean this primarily in the first of Ngai's two senses, as a person who cannot be. To 
think of alien citizens as a problem which cannot be solved might suggest that Asian 
Americans, as defined as antithetical to American citizenship, can never be assimilated into 
citizenship. But as who is cast out from citizenship is contingent and not stable, a more 
accurate prediction might be that someone or some groups will always occupy the category 
alien vis-a-vis the American citizen; the alien may not always and for all purposes be Asian. 
89. This seems true for Mexican Americans as well (witness the "repatriation" program 
referenced above), but I am confining my discussion here to Asian Americans. 
90. On the racialization of Asian Americans as foreign, see Neil Gotanda, Comparative 
Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1689 (2000). 
91. This provides a different articulation of what, in other publications, I have 
differentiated as citizenship as formal status and citizenship as identity. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, 
The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575 (2002). The notion of citizenship in the 
nation versus citizenship as identity seems productive in thinking about how to capture 
nationalism produced against those who lack this form of citizenship. For a masterful 
disaggregation of forms of citizenship, see Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. 
J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447 (2000). 
92. I am indebted to David Eng for suggesting this point. 
93. That our immigration laws presume heterosexual family relations is made evident in 
the fact that same-sex spouses cannot be admitted into the United States as immediate 
relatives, unlike heterosexual spouses. Moreover, until 1990 gay and lesbian noncitizens 
were barred altogether from entering the United States. For a discussion of these laws see 
STEPHEN LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, THIRD EDmON 
151-64 (2002). See generally EITHNE LUIBHEID, ENTRY DENIED: CONTROLLING SEXUALITY 
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out from this trajectory through a racial categorization that depicted 
the Chinese male immigrant as sexually deviant for his lack of access 
to Chinese women and the Chinese female immigrant as sexually 
deviant as a presumptive prostitute.94 Both depictions reflected 
patterns in early Chinese immigrant population, patterns shaped by 
immigration laws.95 The racial characterization of the Chinese 
immigrant as inassimilable and strange relied upon notions of normal 
sexual relations, which were conceptualized only as occurring within 
the heterosexual marital relationship. Furthermore, the Chinese 
immigrant was denied access to reproducing a family, which 
additionally produced the Chinese as aberrant, alien, and non-citizen, 
given the notion of the family as the foundation of civil society. 
Gender is an undertheorized category in Impossible Subjects. The 
reader wonders how the policies Ngai described specifically affected 
women,96 and how those policies were motivated by presumptions 
about gender. The metaphoric association between nation and family 
is a rich one, and it is difficult to imagine that exclusionary policies 
about national belonging did not invoke ideas about kinship or 
reproduction. 97 
The notion of Asian Americans as engaged in family relationships 
that were defective, as different from the desired norm, was an issue in 
Japanese American internment camps, as I will explain. Japanese­
American internment, writes Ngai, stands as the most extreme case of 
alien citizenship (p. 175). The U.S. government imprisoned some 
80,000 American citizens, and 40,000 noncitizens in internment 
camps between the years 1942 and 1945. While the government did 
not formally strip Japanese Americans of their citizenship, it was, in 
effect, "nullified" (p. 175). 
Military evacuation orders, as she suggests, rhetorically effaced the 
citizenship of the 80,000 citizens, by ordering "all persons of Japanese 
ancestry, both aliens, and non-aliens," to report to assembly centers 
AT THE BORDER (2003). 
94. See DAVID ENG, RACIAL CASTRATION: MANAGING MASCULINITY IN ASIAN 
AMERICA (2001 ); GEORGE PEFFER, IF THEY DON'T BRING THEIR WOMEN HERE: CHINESE 
FEMALE IMMIGRATION BEFORE EXCLUSION (1999); NA YAN SHAH, CONTAGIOUS DIVIDES: 
EPIDEMICS AND RACE IN SAN FRANCISCO'S CHINATOWN (2001). 
95. See sources cited supra note 94. 
96. Today a substantial share of undocumented immigrants are women. See 
Undocumented Immigration: Facts and Figures (2004), at http:/1216.239.63.104/search?q= 
cache:Er4lpCobjKUJ:www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000587_undoc_immigrants_facts.pdf+ 
+undocumented+immigrants+women&hl=en (estimating that women made up 41 percent of 
the adult undocumented population). It is not apparent to the reader what the estimated 
gender breakdown of illegal immigration might have been in the 1924 to 1965 period. 
97. For the association of these notions in another context, see RHODA ANN 
KANAANEH, BIRTHING THE NATION: STRATEGIES OF PALESTINIAN WOMEN IN ISRAEL 
(2002). 
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for evacuation (p. 175). Obviously, "citizen" and "non-alien" are not 
equivalent terms. The first promises a panoply of rights and 
guarantees; the other only speaks a negation, one that provides no 
guidance as to the positive status of the person nor any sense as to 
where she might ground her rights. By subsuming citizenship identity 
within the enemy alien status of "Japanese ancestry," and by 
incarcerating citizens for the duration of the war, the U.S. government 
severed the link that Hannah Arendt claimed as so fundamental. 
Citizenship, Arendt wrote, is nothing less than the "right to have 
rights."98 But citizenship must be recognized by the state that would be 
the guarantor of those rights. 
Ngai works through different conceptions of citizenship to explain 
the policies enacted against Japanese Americans through internment. 
In the camps, Japanese Americans were aggressively reeducated in an 
effort to instruct them in American cultural assimilation (p. 177). 
Programs within the camps were touted as Americanizing projects and 
a testimony to the value of American democracy. Thus, Ansel Adams 
could label a photograph of Japanese teenaged girls in the Manzanar 
camp: "Manzanar is only a detour on the road to American 
citizenship" (pp. 178-79). 
These young girls were presumably American citizens as a matter 
of birthright, a citizenship whose associated rights, as interned citizens, 
they could not enjoy. We could read Adams's label to suggest that 
Manzanar was a necessary detour to allow Japanese Americans to 
better learn how to be American citizens before they could realize 
their rights as American citizens. Ngai describes the forms of 
citizenship Japanese Americans were to learn in the camps as cultural 
citizenship and political citizenship. To develop political citizenship, 
the War Relocation Authority (WRA) set up programs of self­
government meant to tutor Japanese Americans in democratic 
processes. WRA policy limited leadership positions in these programs, 
which created community councils of elected block representatives, to 
U.S. citizens; further, meetings had to be conducted only in English. 
As Ngai suggests, this led many Japanese Americans to reject these 
programs as divisive and as dismissive of older family and community 
members (p. 180). 
Cultural citizenship was a project of inculcating American mores 
and traditions considered more conducive to liberal citizenship than 
Japanese culture, which was stigmatized as traditional and feudal. As 
Caroline Chung Simpson and Orin Starn have demonstrated, Japanese 
98. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 296 (1951). As Arendt 
writes, "The Rights of Man, supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable - even in 
countries whose constitutions were based upon them - whenever people appeared who 
were no longer citizens of any sovereign state." Id. at 293. 
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culture was the subject of serious study in the camps. The WRA 
established an anthropological study of Japanese Americans in the 
camps, for the explicit .purpose of developing theories of Japanese 
behavior that would be useful after the war when the United States 
occupied Japan.99 What the anthropologists theorized was a tense 
duality between Japan and America, played out as intergenerational 
conflict between Issei (traditional) and Nissei (modern), which 
suggested that the Japanese American had to be freed from the value 
of filial piety into a modern existence in America. Within the camps, 
Japanese Americans were aggressively reeducated to abandon 
traditional family practices thought to inhibit the "natural" 
development of character that would allow one to progress.100 
The political disenfranchisement of Japanese Americans, thrust 
from citizenship into the category of the "enemy alien," was in part 
justified through this purported cultural difference.101 Now, this 
cultural difference was to be shed in internment camp as a 
precondition for successful incorporation into the American way of 
life. Thus, Manzanar, in the eyes of Adams and the War Relocation 
Authority, potentially constituted not only a detour, but a necessary 
reeducation process before American citizenship. 
But the camps must not be remembered solely as locations for 
experimentation in anthropology and education. They were also the 
site of enormous anxiety. Ngai explains in careful detail the result of 
the 1944 Denationalization Act, which authorized citizens to make 
voluntary renunciation of citizenship if the renunciation was not 
considered detrimental to the interests of the United States. Voluntary 
99. See CAROLINE CHUNG SIMPSON, AN ABSENT PRESENCE: JAPANESE AMERICANS IN 
POSTWAR AMERICAN CULTURE, 1945-1960, at 43-45 (2001). As Simpson argues, the 
anthropological study not only reflected the American propensity for seeing Japanese 
Americans as Japanese aliens, but also assisted in constructing a particular idea about the 
culture and character of both Japanese and Japanese Americans. Id. at 45-47; see also Orin 
Starn, Engineering Internment: Anthropologists and the War Relocation Authority, 13 AM. 
ETHNOLOGIST 700 (1986). 
100. See SIMPSON, supra note 99. Ngai does not address ideas about family in her 
discussion of culture in the camps, but focuses upon the use of native language, kinship 
structures of leadership, religion, and recreational activities. 
101. As Justice Murphy wrote in Korematsu in a sharply-worded dissent: 
In support of this blanket condemnation of all persons of Japanese descent, however, no 
reliable evidence is cited . . . .  
Justification for the exclusion is sought, instead, mainly upon questionable racial and 
sociological grounds . . . .  Individuals of Japanese ancestry are condemned because they are 
said to be a "large, unassimilated, tightly knit racial group, bound to an enemy nation by 
strong ties of race, culture, custom and religion." 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 236-37 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting). For 
discussion, see Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice: Internment, Redress and Denial, 51 UCLA L. 
REV. 933 (2004). 
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renunciation was conceptualized by Attorney General Francis Biddle 
as a means of distinguishing loyal from disloyal Japanese Americans; 
presumably only those disloyal to the United States would choose to 
renounce their U.S. citizenship, facilitating the release of all internees 
who chose to keep their citizenship (p. 187). An earlier attempt at 
sorting loyal from disloyal had relied upon the Leave Clearance 
questionnaire, which had been issued to all internees over the age of 
seventeen. 102 This earlier attempt was a failure. Many more 
purportedly disloyal Japanese Americans were identified than 
expected. Loyalty and disloyalty acquired perverse meanings for 
citizens imprisoned by their own government, who were now asked to 
agree to serve in the U.S. military and renounce any allegiance to 
Japan.103 
Many Japanese Americans approached renunciation with the 
belief that it was the only way to remain in camp. From our present 
vantage point, it might seem strange that Japanese Americans would 
choose to remain in camp, but internees felt enormous fear that they 
would face violence, be separated from their families, or be drafted 
into the military if they left. 
Five thousand, five hundred citizens chose to renounce their 
citizenship. In Tule Lake, the camp segregated for disloyals after the 
Leave Clearance questionnaire, eighty-five percent of citizens over 
seventeen renounced their citizenship. Exemplifying the mental strain 
under which some were operating is the following passage, written by 
an internee who had renounced his citizenship as "the one last thing I 
could do to express my fury toward the government of the United 
States" (p. 192): 
They got me ! The American government threw me into a concentration 
camp, labeled me dangerous because I wouldn't declare my loyalty, 
intimidated me, and subjected me to extreme mental and physical stress. 
In fact, the government did such a good job of manipulating me that I 
just gave up my United States citizenship - voluntarily! Now they could 
deport me to Japan without any trouble at all, I realized.104 
102. The Leave Clearance questionnaire was issued to camp residents in 1943. Question 
#27 asked: "Are you willing to serve in the armed forces of the United States on combat duty 
wherever ordered?" Question #28 asked: "Will you swear unqualified allegiance to the 
United States of America and faithfully defend the United States from any or all attack by 
foreign or domestic forces, and forswear any form of allegiance or obedience to the Japanese 
emperor, or any other foreign government, power, or organization?" See ERIC YAMAMOTO 
ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS AND REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN 
INTERNMENT 197-98 (2001). Those who answered "no" to both questions were known as 
"no-no boys." See JOHN OKADA, No-No BOY (1976). 
103. Renunciation of allegiance to Japan meant statelessness for the lssei, who had no 
birthright citizenship in the United States and were racially ineligible to naturalize. 
104. P. 192 (quoting MINORU KIYOTA, BEYOND LOYALTY: THE STORY OF A KIBEi 
1 11-12 (Linda Kepinger Keenan trans., 1997)). 
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Wayne Collins, an ACLU lawyer, engaged in a heroic battle for 
thirteen years to restore citizenship to the 5,409 renunciates who 
sought to regain it, using the argument that citizenship had been 
renounced under conditions of duress and coercion inculcated not 
only by the internment but also by Japanese nationalists in the camps 
(p. 195). Ngai is careful to point out that this legal approach -
necessary as legal strategy, but which has shaped subsequent scholarly 
representations of the renunciates - reproduces the very stereotypes 
of Japanese culture as patriarchal, coercive and fanatical that underlay 
both the internment and the cultural citizenship project (p. 200). What 
is missing from the narrative, she asserts, is the role of individual 
agency and dual nationalism in actually producing renunciation (pp. 
199-200). But when the Asian American political project of seeking 
acceptance as full citizens has been precisely grounded on the denial 
of dual nationalism or complicated loyalties, it is not surprising that 
representations of the renunciates have submerged any ties to 
Japanese nationalism. As perpetual foreigners, Asian Americans have 
had to deny their foreignness in order to be accepted into 
citizenship.105 And the idea of Japanese American loyalty to the 
United States, exemplified through valorous military service, has been 
pivotal to the grounding of the movement for redress.106 
But after invoking dual nationalism, Ngai steps away, describing it 
as only a weak dual nationalism that was felt by the renunciates. 
Instead, she writes, we must think of Japanese Americans as above all 
"pragmatic people" who made "pragmatic choices that were neither 
irrational nor primarily motivated by nationalist politics," and who 
"were no different from most ordinary people, who are concerned 
more with their individual and family's well-being than with the 
interests of the nation-state" (p. 200). I am struck by Ngai's language 
here, which suggests the need to cast the Japanese Americans who 
renounced their citizenship into the language of pragmatism, 
ordinariness, rationality, individuality and the unit of the family. This 
is the language we use when we want to assert the humanity of actors 
who are otherwise thought to be not quite human, through grounding 
105. The reluctance to envision Asian Americans as having linkages outside of the 
American nation seems to have shaped a historical reluctance to examine ties of 
transnationality. The anthropologist Sylvia Yanagisako has shown this in an examination of 
Asian American history course syllabi; she notes that historical demands for exclusive 
national allegiance by the United States seem replicated through the curricular inclusion of 
only people, relations. communities. and institutions located on U.S. soil as the field of 
inquiry. See Sylvia Yanagisako. TransforminJ< Orienta/ism: Gender, Nationality, and Class in 
Asian American Studies, in NATURALIZING POWER: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST CULTURAL 
ANALYSIS 275 (Sylvia Yanagisako & Carol Delaney eds., 1995). 
106. See Chris K. Iijima, Reparations and the "Model Minority" Ideology of 
Acquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse the Return to Original Humiliation, 40 B.C. L. REV. 
385 (1999). 
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their behavior in explicitly Western concepts of the human.107 Perhaps 
this is not surprising in writing about a context in which Japanese 
Americans were interned precisely because they were not seen as 
individuals who could be discerned as loyal or disloyal.108 But we might 
pause to consider what underlies this depiction, which is the 
association of the idea of the human with the individual, the rational 
actor, and the family member. I would caution that this association 
risks lessening the enforcement of rights of those who do not fit within 
normative constructs of the human and the citizen. 
What has been arguably even more forgotten by historical memory 
than Japanese American citizenship renunciation is the Chinese 
Confession Program. The Confession Program addressed an illegal 
immigration that was both foundational to the existence of the 
Chinese American community and concealed. Ngai estimates that at 
least twenty-five percent of the Chinese American community in 1950 
was unlawfully present (p. 204); some estimate that at least one-half of 
all Chinese immigrants entered illegally during the exclusion era, 
which spanned the late nineteenth century through 1943 (p. 204). 
Because only merchants, teachers, treaty traders and diplomats were 
granted immigrant visas, the primary alternative for entry was for a 
Chinese immigrant to falsely claim that he was entitled to enter as the 
child of a Chinese American citizen, through what was called 
"derivative citizenship. "109 These illegal claims to derivative 
citizenship, establishing what were called "paper sons" - sons only on 
paper - occurred in the context of racist exclusion.11° Nonetheless, 
this was an illegality which was shameful, dangerous, and rarely 
discussed. 
Central to the problem of the illegal immigration of Chinese was 
the inability of the state to authenticate identity. Ngai describes an 
107. Here I would reference the concern that Asians and Asian Americans are 
persistently described as motivated by culture in a way that white Americans are not. As a 
case in point, one could look to media depictions of Chai Soua Vang, currently indicted for 
killing six deer hunters, and who was reported to be a "shaman Hmong healer" who "seeks 
the aid of the spirit world." Stephen Kinzer, Hmong Hunter Charged With 6 Murders is a 
Shaman, Friends and Family Say, N.Y. DMES, Dec. 1, 2004, at Al8. This is not to say that 
Vang, or any other Asian American, is unmotivated by culture. Rather, we must all be 
understood to be both individual agents and shaped by cultural forces, in which are 
embedded political and material histories and pressures. 
108. On the differing treatment of German Americans and Italian Americans, who, 
unlike Japanese Americans, were able to access individual loyalty hearings and escape mass 
internment, see YAMAMOTO ET AL., supra note 102, at 175-76. 
109. P. 204. Other alternatives were for Chinese to use fake merchant certificates or to 
claim they were American citizens by birth (pp. 204-05) .  
110. P. 206 (writing that Chinese, who believed that exclusion was immoral, even if it  
was legal, "believed paper immigration was morally justified because it  was one of the few 
ways to enter the United States when exclusion made legal immigration impossible). Id. 
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upwardly spiraling body of evidentiary requirements which ironically 
created the documentation of citizenship (p. 205). This was a 
citizenship premised on oral claims that had been followed - and 
"authenticated" - by certificates of identity, passports, and a 
subsequent chain of legitimized relatives. 
The only way to undo this documentation was through the same 
process that originally created it - through oral testimony and 
interrogation, in the form of the confession (p. 206). The Confession 
Program was launched in the context of extreme pressure on the one­
hundred-five-person annual quota established for Chinese 
immigration in the 1943 Magnuson Act (which had lifted Chinese 
exclusion).1 1 1 Turmoil in China after the Chinese Revolution led 
117 ,000 Chinese American derivative citizens to apply for U.S. 
passports at the United States Consulate in Hong Kong in 1950 (p. 
206). The U.S. government responded with an escalating series of 
requirements in an unsuccessful attempt to cut down on numbers.112 
This overwhelming task loomed in a context where applicants were 
thought more likely to be Chinese spies than actual derivative citizens. 
By the mid-1950s Red China was American's primary enemy (p. 208). 
In 1956 the INS launched the Confession Program, inspired by the 
experience of uncovering one individual who turned out not to be a 
citizen, thus exposing the fact that thirty-four putative relatives of his 
were not citizens either. But the service had sufficient evidence to 
deport only three of them. After learning that ten of the alleged 
relatives were veterans, the INS explained to them that if they 
confessed they would be eligible for naturalized citizenship under their 
real names. After extensive family consultation, all confessed. The 
Service "had thus discovered a method of exposing an entire family 
tree."113 
The Program, approved by the INS central office and without any 
statutory authorization, created a procedure for an administrative 
adjustment of status. If an individual confessed to having entered by 
fraudulent means, he would be assisted - if possible - to legalize his 
status. If he had served in the armed services for ninety days, he was 
eligible for naturalized citizenship. If he had resided continually in the 
United States for seven years, he was eligible for permanent residency 
under suspension of deportation. But the INS held out the possibility 
of relief only to confessors who named all the names of those in their 
families. The list was cross-checked against the statements of other 
111. Magnuson Act, Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, § 1, 57 Stat. 600. 
1 12. These requirements were often difficult if not impossible to meet and included: 
blood tests to prove paternity, bone X-rays to prove age, photographs from childhood, 
affidavits from the American father in triplicate, and so forth. P. 207. 
1 13. P. 219. The Program also followed grand juries that were impaneled in 1956 to 
investigate fraudulent entry by Chinese in San Francisco and New York. Pp. 221-28. 
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family members, a tedious process that meant that confession could 
take an entire year (pp. 219-21). 
From 1957 to 1965 at least 11,336 Chinese Americans confessed. 
Another 19,124 were implicated as holding false citizenship by the 
confessions of others. The vast majority received legal status; of those 
who were found ineligible, a small percentage was deported. 
Presumably, the derivative citizens waiting in Hong Kong who were 
relatives of those who confessed and were then identified as false 
citizens were no longer able to enter the United States. Ngai suggests 
that the Confession Program served "as a means of renegotiating the 
terms of Chinese Americans' citizenship" (p. 223). Many Chinese 
Americans resisted the state's efforts to criminalize the entire 
community through engaging in citizenship practices of legal 
opposition and lobbying. These practices may have been important to 
the INS's decision to create the carrot of legalized status in return for 
confession, rather than to simply use the stick of criminal prosecution 
(p. 223). 
Yet confession did not lead to redemption. Ngai writes the 
community "could not entirely redeem its virtue" during the Cold War 
and against a backdrop of a racialized vision of all Chinese as illegal 
and dangerous (p. 223). Thus, confession provided legal status, 
including formal citizenship, for many paper immigrants, but this 
status did not produce "social legitimacy" (p. 223). While Chinese 
Americans, through confession, were given the opportunity for 
legitimated formal citizenship in the state, they were still denied 
citizenship in the nation. The nation had been mapped, in part, 
through their exclusion, and rectifying their formal citizenship would 
not shift this construction.114 President Franklin Roosevelt had stated 
in 1943 that Chinese exclusion was a "historic mistake" and an 
"injustice to our friends. "115 Whether a similar statement would have 
been made at the height of the Cold War, and whether the carrot of 
legalization would have been proffered were it not for the hope of 
rooting out fraud and deception among those considered proxies for 
an enemy nation, appears unlikely. 
To think of alien citizens as "impossible subjects" in Ngai's second 
sense, as a "problem that cannot be solved," could suggest that Asian 
Americans, as defined as antithetical to American citizenship, can 
never be fully assimilated into the American nation. But we might also 
114. Here we could consider Lisa Lowe's statement that "the American of Asian 
descent remains the symbolic 'alien,' the metonym for Asia who by definition cannot be 
imagined as sharing in America." LOWE, supra note 56, at 6. 
115. As Ngai points out, the admission of this mistake did not serve as a basis for an 
amnesty program that would have legalized all Chinese who entered during the exclusion 
period. Pp. 223-24. 
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theorize the persistence of the category of alien citizenship as not 
inevitably linked to Asian American racialization, but as a category 
whose content may shift depending on U.S. foreign policy. The war in 
which we are presently engaged has been dubbed the "war on terror." 
With no specific national target, and thus no particular nationals to 
consider the agents of foreign states, the war on terror aims at a 
loosely defined group of individuals dubbed "terrorists."  The "alien 
citizens" associated with this enemy are Arab, Muslim, and South 
Asian Americans.116 
Arab, Muslim, and South Asian Americans now possess a 
citizenship which is both more broadly and more diffusely at risk than 
that of Japanese Americans during World War II, as the war on terror 
is not country-specific. Just as Japanese Americans were subsumed 
under the category "Japanese" during World War II, the racialization 
of this group is subsumed into the category of the putative "terrorist." 
If these alien citizens are considered terrorists, we might think about 
the tension between the terms alien, citizen, and terrorist. Both 
terrorist and alien constitute opposites to the idea of the citizen. 
Terrorist and alien are sometimes synonymous. The term "domestic 
terrorist" is necessary because of the unstated presumption that the 
terrorist is not domestic, but foreign, and an alien.117 Governmental 
responses in the war on terror have primarily targeted noncitizens, 
aliens who are purportedly terrorists.118 Guantanamo has become a 
repository for noncitizens indefinitely detained as "enemy 
combatants. "  And the category of the visa overstayer has been newly 
racialized as "terrorist" after the September 1 1 th attacks, due to the 
fact that four of the hijackers had overstayed their visas.119 
Terrorist and citizen are oppositional terms. Thus the "terrorist 
citizen" seems also an impossible subject. Putative terrorists are not 
considered deserving of the protections of citizenship. A recent 
nationwide poll conducted by Cornell University revealed that nearly 
half of all Americans believe that the U.S. government should restrict 
1 16. For explanations of this racialization, see Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by 
Law: Post-September 11th Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1259 
(2004), and Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, supra note 91. 
117. See, e.g. , John Brigham, Unusual Punishment: The Federal Death Penalty in the 
United States, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 195, 230 (2004) (referring to Timothy McVeigh as a 
"domestic terrorist"). 
118. For the argument that the war on terror has targeted unpopular noncitizens, 
reflecting historical patterns of incursions on civil liberties and auguring future measures 
against citizens, see DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2003). 
119. See Homeland Security Overstay, supra note 7 (exemplifying the linkage between 
visa overstaying and terrorism). 
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the civil liberties of Muslim Americans.120 Moreover, being marked as 
a terrorist has correlated with the loss of one's formal citizenship. We 
can think here of Yaser Hamdi, whose 2004 settlement agreement 
with federal prosecutors required him to renounce his U.S. citizenship 
as a condition of his release.121 We could also consider an increasing 
number of cases where prosecutors have sought to denaturalize U.S. 
citizens accused of engaging in terrorist activity or providing material 
support for organizations certified as terrorist organizations.122 Thus, 
we can see as with the Japanese American renunciates, the discomfort 
with transnational ties and split loyalties at a time of war manifest in 
the notion that citizenship demands singular loyalties.123 And the 
notion of the American citizen has consolidated through concerns 
about national security, against the idea of the terrorist.124 
We can see present-day connections to the Chinese Confession 
Program, which seems to be a precursor of visa programs which 
provide lawful immigration status in exchange for the noncitizen 
providing the government critical, reliable information in criminal 
120. See Poll Shows U.S. Views on Muslim-Americans, Nearly Half of Those Surveyed 
Say Some Rights Should be Restricted, MSNBC NEWS, Dec. 17, 2004, at http://www.msnbc. 
msn.com/id/6729916. 
121. See Settlement Agreement, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, (Sept. 17, 2004), at http://news. 
findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/hamdi/91704stlagrement2.html. 
There are several issues to consider in his case: whether the citizenship renunciation 
passes muster as "voluntary" when he agreed to the renunciation as a condition of release; 
whether his status as a citizen of Saudi Arabia, as an Arab, and as an "accidental" citizen of 
the United States through birth on U.S. soil from nonimmigrant parents has engendered a 
different treatment than in the case of John Walker Lindh, who faced rhetorical calls for the 
stripping of his citizenship but none in practice; and whether the impetus for the 
renunciation on the part of the U.S. government was symbolic or in fact was to enable the 
U.S. to claim in the future that he can be dealt with through immigration law as an "alien" 
with lesser or nonexistent Constitutional protections. 
122. See e.g., Todd Bensom, Government Moves to Strip Citizenship of Former Holy 
Land Foundation Board Member, GARMO.COM, Oct. 18, 2004 (describing the case of Rasmi 
Khader Almallah), at http://www.garmo.com/archives/00000394/shtml; U.S. Muslim Official 
Pleads Not Guilty, Bail Denied, MUSLIM AM. Soc'Y, Oct. 29, 2003 (describing the case of 
Abdurahman Alamoudi), at http://www.masnet.org/news.asp?id=623. 
123. We can see this as well for citizens who do not fall into the "alien citizen "  category 
in the provisions of the Domestic Security Enhancement Act (known as Patriot Act II). This 
is draft legislation that was prepared within the federal Department of Justice, which has yet 
to be proposed in Congress. This legislation would provide for the presumptive 
denationalization of American citizens charged with "joining or serving in or providing 
material support to" an organization that the executive branch has designated a terrorist 
organization. See Memorandum Obtained by NOW Television Program, Domestic 
Security Enhancement Act of 2003, Section-by-Section Analysis 30-33 (Jan. 9, 2003) 
(analyzing Title V: Enhancing Immigration and Border Security), at 
http://www.pbs.org/now/politics/patriot2-hi.pdf. 
For a discussion of the relationship between denationalization and split allegiances, see 
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1471 (1986). 
124. See Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, supra note 91. 
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prosecutions.125 Shortly after September 11th, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft offered visas and the potential reward of legalization as an 
inducement to noncitizens to come forward with information 
concerning terrorism. It is not apparent if anyone accepted this 
proffer.126 The danger for noncitizens in relying upon the hope that 
they will gain lawful immigration status is made apparent not only 
through the example of the Confession Program, but also in a recent 
case where prosecutors chose to issue only three visas to fourteen 
undocumented immigrants who offered to provide testimony in the 
trial of Zacarias Moussaoui in the hope that they would receive legal 
status. The other eleven were left in fear of deportation.127 Bill Hing 
has made the explicit linkage between the Confession Program and 
the Bush guest-worker proposal, writing that in both cases, 
communities have mistakenly conceptualized the programs as 
providing amnesty, when, in reality, what was offered in exchange for 
identifying oneself to the government was the risk of deportation.128 
Immigration tells us who belongs. On the winning side are the 
terms legal and citizen; on the losing side are the terms alien and 
illegal. Impossible Subjects shows us that legal categorization can shift, 
that belonging is not just a matter of legal categorization, and that 
perceptions of who belongs - and who does not - will shape legal 
categorization. In that sense, we need to always consider three layers 
of analysis: the legal category at issue; the identity of who is occupying 
that legal category; and the relationship between the production of 
that legal category and identity. 
CONCLUSION 
Ngai asserts that the task of her book is not to resolve the 
foundational problem of the relationship between sovereignty, 
citizenship, and immigration. But if we cannot detach sovereignty 
125. S visas can be granted for critical reliable information essential to the success of an 
authorized criminal investigation or prosecution and can be converted after three years into 
a green card. 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(a)(15)(S) (2000); 22 C.F.R. § 41.83 (2002). For a discussion of 
the granting of S visas to exploited workers who provided testimony against those who 
trafficked them, see Leti Volpp, Migrating Identities: On Labor, Culture, and Law, 27 N .C. J. 
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 507 (2002). 
126. Neil A. Lewis. The Informants: Immigrants Offered Incentives to Give Evidence on 
Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at B7. 
127. Nina Bernstein, A Visa Case With a Twist: 9111 Illegal Immigrants Testified to Try to 
Stay in U.S. , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16. 2004, at B2. The immigrants in this case sought a U visa, 
for which the S visa provided a precursor, and were planning to testify about their 
bereavement or trauma in the death penalty phase of Moussaoui's case. Id. 
128. Bill Ong Hing, Legal Status: Amnesty or Immigration Trap? CHI. TRIB., Jan. 9, 
2004, at 17. In the case of the Confession Program, only a small minority of those who 
confessed were actually deported. Ngai at 221. 
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from immigration all together,129 we might, she writes, "detach 
sovereignty and its master, the nation-state, from their claims of 
transcendence and . . .  critique them as products of history." (p. 12). 
Thus, we can see that the sovereign right to determine membership 
need not be unconditional (p. 12). 
There is one story in the book that suggests such an alternative, set 
in the context of discussions about the reform of the national origins 
quotas. The Reverend Paul Empie of the National Lutheran Council, 
in a speech delivered to the American Immigration Conference in 
1959, argued for a vision of American national interest on the terrain 
of "international understanding, well-being, and peace" (p. 253). 
Empie asserted that the conventional view of restricting immigration 
as an exercise of national sovereignty was not based in an appeal to 
reason or morality, but was justified through national power and state 
violence. Rather, he suggested, we think about "the interlocking and 
mutual interests of all nations with regard to the immigration of 
peoples, the interaction of culture, and the respect of universal human 
rights" (p. 253). Empie's position was not an uninstrumental one. He 
was concerned about the United States' position in a world 
characterized by extreme disparities in wealth and power, and he was 
not seeking to eliminate all controls on immigration. But he did 
suggest that we disaggregate our immigration policy from a nationally 
defined interest that separated the interests of the United States from 
the interests of the rest of the globe. 
Empie's prescription would require us to make two epistemic 
leaps. First, our present-day narrative of America as a nation of 
immigrants is founded on the presumption of a liberal America, 
created by individual acts of uncoerced consent.130 But American 
immigration history is better understood as shaped by conquest, 
colonialism, and Cold War politics.131 Foregrounding this narrative 
would require that we abandon our amnesia about policies creating 
illegal aliens and alien citizens, forgettings that have been constituent 
to our national identity.132 Second, while recognizing the central role of 
129. For an articulation of the arguments in favor of detaching sovereignty from 
immigration, see Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 193 (2003). 
130. P. 5 (quoting BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER 75 (2001) 
(describing the role immigrants play in supporting the narrative of liberalism's "fictive 
foundation in individual acts of uncoerced consent")). 
131. See Ngai's discussion of the imported colonialism of Filipino laborers, pp. 94-126, 
the conquest of Mexico and subsequent importation of racialized Mexican labor, pp. 127-66, 
and the Chinese Confession Program during the Cold War, pp. 202-24. 
132. This might also mean that we reconceptualize the origin story of sovereign nations 
as founded not through social contract, but through force. See GIORGIO AGAMBEN, HOMO 
SACER: SOVEREIGN POWER AND BARE LIFE (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., 1998) (arguing 
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force in historically shaping American immigration policy, we might 
reject the association between sovereignty and the unlimited ability of 
the sovereign to determine its membership (p. 12). Ngai asks that we 
learn from her archive that how the sovereign has shaped membership 
has shifted over time, and thus, is again in our own time, alterable (p. 
12). She asks that we be honest about our past, but that we also think 
boldly about our future. 
May Impossible Subjects indeed lead to bold changes. Ngai creates 
that possibility, through altering our vision of immigration history, in 
showing us the constructed and contingent nature of its legal 
regulation. Impossible Subjects is essential reading. We are the 
beneficiaries of this luminous book, which, in bringing to our attention 
an archive and an analysis that has heretofore escaped us, brushes 
history against the grain.133 
that rather than see sovereignty as rooted in the social contract we should see its origins in 
banishment, exclusion, and the management of "bare life"). 
133. In the words of Walter Benjamin: 
There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism. 
And just as such a document is never free of barbarism, so barbarism taints the manner in 
which it was transmitted from one hand to another. The historical materialist therefore 
dissociates himself from this process of transmission as far as possible. He regards it as his 
task to brush history against the grain. 
Walter Benjamin, On the Concept of History, in 4 WALTER BENJAMIN: SELECTED 
WRffiNGS, 1938-1940, at 392 (Michael W. Jennings, ed. 2003). 
